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Traditional claims in favor of decentralization are in terms of better represen-
tation of local preferences and better accountability of local politicians. The
recent economic literature o￿ers support for both these claims (e.g. Lockwood,
2006). But skeptical views remain. An interesting and well founded objection
is that decentralization is not akin to separation; in a unitary State, decen-
tralization is usually only "partial" as ￿nancing remains largely in the hands
of the central government (Brueckner, 2009; Ambrosanio and Bordignon, 2006;
Boadway, 2006). According to critics, this implies that decentralization may
weaken, rather than reinforce, political accountability (Devarajan et al., 2007).
Intuitively, if citizens are uncertain about whom to blame for the taxes they
have to pay, they would also be less able to punish or reward governments for
their behavior. In turn, this may lead to more slack in the provision of public
services. Accordingly, it is self ￿nancing, more than decentralization per sØ, a
key ingredient of a successful decentralization process.
Given its policy relevance, it would be clearly important to assess the valid-
ity of this claim. Doing this in general terms may be di￿cult, but one can at
least try to learn something from speci￿c real world examples. This is what we
attempt to do in this paper, by focussing on an important local ￿nance reform
in the Italian context. In 1999, following a decade of decentralization, it was
decided to o￿er Italian municipalities a more robust source of tax revenue, by
allowing them to levy a surcharge on their residents’ personal income tax (PIT)
base, the most important national tax. This surcharge was to accompany the
traditional source of tax revenue for local governments, a property tax (ICI)
raised on the municipality housing (estimated) wealth. But there was an im-
portant di￿erence. While the choices concerning the property tax ￿including tax
rates and a tax allowance for resident owners￿ could clearly and unambiguously
attributed to the municipal government, this was not the case with the PIT
surcharge. Central government maintained its full powers on PIT, including the
de￿nition of tax base and tax brackets ￿ all features that indeed are usually
(marginally) changed on a yearly basis by the central government. Municipal
governments could only raise a ￿at surcharge on their PIT base, by 0.2% per
year up to a total of 0.5%. In contrast, the average central government tax rate
on the PIT base was about 18% in our sample in the same period. As a result,
citizens might have had some di￿culty in discerning in the total PIT they had
to pay, the part which was due to municipal decisions ￿and maybe even few in-
centives to learn about it, given its small share on the total 1. On the contrary,
the property tax rate is independently paid by each house owner directly to the
municipality where the estate is located, a task which requires each taxpayer to
get informed about the property tax rate and the tax allowance, again usually
set up and changed on a yearly basis by municipal governments.
Summing up, it is then realistic to assume that the municipal surcharge on
the PIT base was for most citizens less "transparent" than the municipal prop-
erty tax, in the sense of allowing for a less precise attribution of responsibility
1It is true that the municipal surcharge rate is indicated in the PIT tax form of each tax
payer. But, as a matter of fact, most Italians never actually come to see their tax form. For
dependent workers, the PIT, including the municipal surcharge tax, is directly withheld by the
company they work for on a monthly base; and most self-employers also use tax professionals
to ￿ll properly the their tax forms.
2to the di￿erent levels of government (e.g. Bordignon and Minelli, 2001). Going
back to the previously mentioned literature, this would suggest that the polit-
ical incentives for using the two di￿erent taxes may also have been di￿erent.
In the next section, with the aim of uncovering these di￿erent incentives, we
study these e￿ects in a simple political agency model a’ la Besley (2007). In
our model, municipal Mayors may be of two types, competent or incompetent.
Incompetent Mayors can replicate the ￿scal choices of competent Mayors, but at
a higher cost in terms of e￿ort. The economy lasts two periods, an assumption
which captures an important feature of Italian municipal governments as May-
ors are subjected to a term limit (they can only run twice). Lacking electoral
incentives, incompetent Mayors would then raise more taxes and exert less ef-
fort than competent ones. But in their ￿rst term in power, incompetent Mayors
may nevertheless prefer to imitate e￿cient ones, in the hope that this will result
in a re-election, as citizens cannot directly observe the type of Mayor, but can
only try to infer it by observing his tax choices. Using this simple model, we
then study political equilibria in the two cases, when Mayors can only use the
property tax, as in the pre-1999 reform period, and when they can use both the
property tax and the tax surcharge on PIT. Importantly, in the latter case, we
assume that citizens are unable to discern precisely which part is played by each
level of government in setting up the total PIT tax rate. We show that pooling
equilibria are more likely after the reform than before it; in equilibrium, in the
￿rst term in o￿ce, incompetent Mayors make a larger use of the surcharge rate
on PIT, which can only be imperfectly observed by citizens, as this o￿ers them a
less costly way to imitate the competent governments. A number of empirically
testable implications derive from these theoretical observations. Speci￿cally,
we show that: 1) ￿rst term Mayors should use the PIT surcharge more than
second term Mayors; 2) political turnover should be lower following the reform,
and in particular for Mayors using more the PIT surcharge. Furthermore, 3)
the reform might also a￿ect the decision to run again by Mayors, as it should be
easier to get re-elected after the reform. We then take these predictions to data,
building a comprehensive data set on Piedmont, a region in the North of Italy
with a very large number of municipalities (around 1,200), and collecting mu-
nicipal ￿scal and political data both before and after the reform. Our empirical
results turn out to be broadly consistent with our predictions. In particular, we
￿nd strong support for prediction 1 above, and some support for predictions 2
and 3. Vindicating the above literature, our results then support the idea that
transparency in ￿nancial tools is indeed a crucial factor for political accountabil-
ity. This has important implications for the optimal design of local ￿nancing, a
point to which we will come back again in the conclusions.
We are of course not the ￿rst to raise the issue of accountability in govern-
ment ￿nancing. Versions of the same idea have already appeared in the theoret-
ical literature (see Besley, 2007 for a review) and applied to such di￿erent items
as the observability of government reporting procedures (Milesi-Ferretti 2000),
government’s choice between taxes or debt (Alt and Dreyer Lassen 2003), the
hidden ￿nancing of interest groups (Coate and Morris 1995), the trade o￿ be-
tween accountability and e￿ciency (Bordignon and Minelli, 2001), the political
economic budget cycle (Rogo￿ and Siebert 1988), local public good provision
under shared accountability (Joanis, 2010) and so on. But, to the best of our
knowledge, we are the ￿rst to attempt to provide a direct test of the idea, by
comparing the ￿scal and political choices of local governments both before and
3after a reform that directly a￿ected the transparency of their ￿nancing tools.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model
and derives our theoretical results. Section 3 derives and summarizes the main
empirical predictions of the model. Section 4 describes the data set and explains
in more detail the Italian local institutions. Section 5 describes our empirical
strategy and derives and comments our results. Section 6 concludes. The Ap-




We consider an economy with a large number of identical citizens. The repre-
sentative consumer in this economy has utility function:
u = U(h) + c + V (1   l) (1)
where h is housing services, c is private consumption, l is labor supply. U(:)
and V (:) are both increasingly and strictly concave functions, di￿erentiable to
any required order. Buying a house is costly, but we assume consumers expect
from investing in housing, in addition to current housing services, some future
returns (e.g. capital gains due to an increase in housing pricing). Let r < 1
indicate the present net value of these returns for each unity of housing bought.
We assume that the (local) property tax has mainly the e￿ect of reducing these
net returns, an hypothesis which ￿nds some empirical support in the Italian
context. The consumer is also taxed on her labor income, in a way which will
be better detailed below. Normalizing units so that buying one unit of housing
costs one unit of numeraire, and also assuming the (￿xed) wage rate to be one,
the consumer’s budget constraint can be written as:
c + (1   (1   )r)h = (1   )l (2)
where  is the property tax on housing wealth and  is the labor tax. In
the following, we will identify the personal income tax with the labor tax ￿ a
very good approximation for the Italian context as labor (and pension) incomes
cover more than 90% of the total income tax base 2. The consumer supplies
labor and uses her net labor income to buy private consumption and housing
services. Because of the expected future returns from housing, the price of a
unit of housing is less than one, p  (1   (1   )r): Notice that dp=d = r > 0,
so that a higher property tax increases the current price of one unit of housing.
The FOC conditions for the consumer’s problem 3 can be written as:
U0(h) = p (3)
V 0(1   l) = 1    (4)
2Most capital incomes are subjected to separate taxation and except for dividends for ￿rm
owners, do not enter into the income tax base of the tax payer.
3SOC are automatically satis￿ed by the assumed concavity of U(:) and V (:):We assume
internal solutions.
4where a prime indicates a derivative and an asterisk optimal values. Inverting
these functions, we obtain the consumer’s demand functions,
h = H() (5)
and
l = L() (6)
Notice that separability and linearity in private consumption implies that
each demand (=supply, in the case of labor) is a function of its net of tax
price only. This will be useful below. Furthermore, strict concavity implies
H0() < 0 and L0() < 0: For future reference, let "h =  H0()=H() and
"l =  L0()=L() be the corresponding price elasticities.
2.2 Governments
The utility function of a generic local policy maker (e.g. "Mayor" from now on)
is given by




where u is the utility of the (representative) consumer, E > 0 is an exogenous
utility deriving from the pleasure of being in o￿ce ("ego rents", including any
monetary bene￿ts from holding o￿ce), and e is the "e￿ort" that the Mayor
makes in order to increase the e￿ciency of public services (see below). That
is, local policy makers are benevolent, but also like to be in o￿ce and dislike
having to make an e￿ort in order to increase the productivity of public services.
The marginal disutility of e￿ort depends on a parameter s, with a higher s
implying a higher utility loss for any given level of e￿ort. Policy makers di￿er
in the parameter s. For simplicity, we assume there are only two types of
Mayors, a "competent" one, with marginal disutility of e￿ort given by s and an
"incompetent" one , with marginal disutility given by s; where s > s > 0: We
assume thorough that e  0 , that basically means that a Mayor cannot cash
the local tax revenue for private consumption, surely a reasonable assumption
in the Italian context.
Policy makers, when in o￿ce, need to o￿er a (￿xed) amount of per capita
public services (=public goods), which we normalize to unity 4. Letting R in-
dicate per capita local tax revenue, local government’s budget constraint can
then be written as
1 = R + e (8)
Hence, "e￿ort" is here introduced as a (partial) "substitute" for tax revenue;
e￿ort can be used to reduce the amount of tax revenue that needs to be levied in
order to provide the given amount of public services. As an interpretation, e can
be thought of as the ability of the local government to collect other resources
4Local public goods enter separately in the utility function of consumers and can therefore
be ignored in the following analysis.
5beside tax revenues, or as his ability to organize the municipal administration
so as to reduce the tax revenue needed to ￿nance a given unity of services. To
R can be given di￿erent interpretations, as discussed below.
2.3 Benchmark analysis
To begin our analysis, let us start by assuming that local governments can only
use the property tax (the income tax is set by the central government and is
therefore given for the local government). As discussed in the Introduction,
this captures the situation of Italian municipalities before the 1999 reform (see
section 4 for more details). Let us also suppose that the economy lasts one time
period only. A Mayor of type s , when in charge, would then choose the property
tax and his level of e￿ort so as to maximize his welfare function subject to the
budget constraint; that is:





1 = H() + e (10)
Notice that the Mayor takes into account the e￿ect of his choices on the
consumer’s utility and demand functions. Substituting for the budget constraint
in the welfare function of Mayors, invoking the envelope theorem, and assuming
interior solutions5, the FOC condition for this problem can be written as:
r = s(1   H())(1   "h()) (11)
The SOC condition for the same problem requires:
 sH())(1   "h())2   se"h
() < 0 (12)
where "h
() is the derivative of the price elasticity with respect to property
tax rate. A su￿cient condition for the SOC to hold is therefore that "h
() > 0.
In the following, we will assume this to be the case.
Totally di￿erentiating (11), it is easy to check that d=ds > 0. As "h() <
1 at the optimum, this also implies by the government budget constraint, that
de=ds < 0:That is, quite intuitively, "incompetent" Mayors would provide less
e￿ort in equilibrium and therefore tax consumers more than "competent" ones.
To emphasize this fact, let us rewrite the optimal choices of Mayors as a function
of s; (s), e(s): Our previous discussion therefore implies (s) > (s) and
e(s) < e(s):
2.4 Two periods with asymmetric information
To provide electoral incentives to governments, let us now instead assume that
there are two periods6. In the ￿rst period, after that the central government
5To insure interior solutions, it is su￿cient to assume that s is large enough.
6This ￿ts quite nicely with the Italian situation, as Mayors are allowed to serve for two
terms only.
6has set the tax on labor, the incumbent local government sets up e￿ort and
the property tax. Consumers then make their choices about housing and labor
supply. At the end of this period, an election takes place and consumers vote for
re-electing the incumbent or for electing an opposing candidate. In the second
period, whoever is in charge sets again the property tax rates, and consumers
make their choices. The world ends here. Thus, the two periods are identical,
except that at the end of the ￿rst period there is an election. The consumers
do not observe the type of Mayor or the level of e￿ort that the Mayor makes
in equilibrium, but observe the tax rates they have to pay. Consumers however
expect politicians ￿both incumbent policy makers and the opponent candidates
￿to be competent with probability q: Mayors instead know their type. What
would then be the choices of the two types of government and of the consumers?
To answer this question, we look at the Bayesian perfect equilibria of this
game; that is, at equilibria where each agent’s strategy is optimal given the
strategies of any other agent and given his beliefs about any other agent’s type,
and where beliefs, whenever it is possible, are derived according to Bayes’rule.
A usual, to solve the model, we work backwards. In the second period, as there
is no future ahead, each government would just select his favorite choices; i.e.
(s), e(s); for s = (s;s): But in the ￿rst period, the incompetent Mayor may
attempt to exploit his superior knowledge in order to convince the voter he is
competent and so be re-elected. To analyze this case, as customarily in this
literature (e.g. see Besley, 2007), we suppose that the competent government
does not play strategically and only plays his preferred strategy in all periods
(e.g., he plays (s), e(s) in both periods)7. This allows us to ￿x out-of-
equilibrium beliefs in a very convenient way, as this assumption implies that
if the rational consumer observed in the ￿rst period anything di￿erent from
(s) (the optimal choice for the competent government), she would immediately
understand that the incumbent Mayor is incompetent and thus vote for the
opposing candidate at the ensuing elections. In turn, this implies that the
incompetent Mayor has really only two strategies to play in the ￿rst period (as
can be easily shown, any other strategy is strictly dominated by one of these
two). He might either play his preferred strategy, sets (s) in the ￿rst period,
saves e￿ort and accepts defeat at the elections. Or he can mimic the competent
type, plays (s) , selects e appropriately, and hopes this will result in a re-
election. By playing the mimicking strategy, the incompetent Mayor su￿ers a
loss in the ￿rst period, which is readily computed to be
 w1 = u((s))  
s
2
(e(s)2)   (u((s))  
s
2
(e(s))2) < 0 (13)
This welfare loss must be compared with the potential advantage in terms
of the probability of being re-elected. Suppose that n1 is the probability of
re-election that the incompetent government expects by playing the mimicking
strategy (if the incumbent is not re-elected, his utility is normalized to zero in
the second period). The incompetent Mayor would then play the mimicking
strategy if
 w1 + n1(u((s))  
s
2
(e(s))2 + E)  0 (14)
7The equilibrium we describe would still exist even if competent Mayors behaved strategi-







where  2 (0;1) is the discount factor. Notice that 0 < k1 < 1 and that k1
is strictly increasing in the di￿erence between (s   s) and strictly decreasing in
the exogenous utility for holding o￿ce, E. This is intuitive. A larger di￿erence
between (s   s) implies a higher cost for the incompetent Mayor to mimic the
competent one, while a larger E implies a higher reward for the incompetent
government if he manages to be re-elected.
To see if the mimicking strategy pays for the incompetent Mayor, we have
to compute the equilibrium election probability n1. At the equilibrium, the
rational consumer would of course expect the incompetent incumbent Mayor
to play the mimicking strategy. But as she observes the same choices by both
types of government in all cases, her ex post beliefs, having observed (s);
can only coincide with her ex ante beliefs, q. In other words, under these
equilibrium strategies for the two types of governments, the voter does not
learn anything about the quality of government from ￿rst period observations.
Hence, the consumer is indi￿erent between re-electing the incumbent or electing
the opposing candidate. To rule out mixed strategy equilibria, let us then just
assume that when indi￿erent, the consumer votes for the incumbent. This
implies n1 = 1: We can then conclude that the incompetent Mayor will play the
mimicking strategy in the ￿rst period whenever   k1: For future reference, let
us call a fully pooling equilibrium an equilibrium where the incompetent Mayor
in the ￿rst period just does what the competent one would do in the same case.
On the other hand, if  < k1, it is easy to check that the fully pooling
equilibrium cannot be sustained, while a separating equilibrium, where each
type of Mayor plays his favorite strategy in the ￿rst period, can be sustained.
At a separating equilibrium, the rational consumer will assign probability 1 that
the government playing (s), e(s) is a competent one and will then re-elect
him for sure (as 1 > q) at the ensuing elections. But as  < k1 deviating to
(s), e(s) from the separating equilibrium, it is however not convenient for the
incompetent Mayor -whatever the beliefs of the consumers upon observing this
deviation￿ as he is however better o￿ by sticking at his preferred strategy (s),
e(s) and losing the election. This implies that the separating equilibrium is
an equilibrium for our game when  < k1. By the same token, the separating
equilibrium cannot be an equilibrium for   k1, as the incompetent Mayor
would then have a pro￿table deviation (e.g. playing (s), e(s) and being re-
elected for sure) which would destroy this equilibrium. We can then summarize
this discussion as follows:
Proposition 1 Consider a two period economy, where local governments can
only select the property tax and where competent Mayors always play their fa-
vorite strategy in each period. If   k1 there exists a pure strategy fully pooling
equilibrium where the incompetent Mayor will mimic the competent one in the
￿rst period, setting (s), e(s) in this period. At this pooling equilibrium, the
incompetent Mayor will be re-elected for sure. If  < k1 there exists a pure
strategy separating equilibrium where each type of government selects his fa-
vorite strategy in the ￿rst period (e.g. the incompetent Mayor plays (s), e(s)
8in the ￿rst period). At this equilibrium, the competent Mayor is re-elected for
sure, while the incompetent Mayor is defeated at the elections.
Quite intuitively, then, it will be the more likely to observe pooling equilibria,
the smaller the di￿erence in productivity between competent and incompetent
Mayors, the more policy makers care about being in o￿ce, and the more they
care about the future.
2.5 A local surcharge on the income tax
Let us now study how results change when a surcharge rate on the national
income tax is also o￿ered to the local government 8. Suppose then now that
the total income tax rate is the summation of a central tax rate T and a
local surcharge one t  0; so that  = T + t. Also assume that the central
government moves ￿rst, and the local government moves later, having observed
the T chosen by the central government. Consider then again our game above,
maintaining all our previous assumptions unchanged. If the consumer could also
observe T (as she certainly observes  and therefore t), it is easy to see that
our previous results would go through (qualitatively) unchanged. Again, in the
￿rst period the incompetent Mayor would only have the choice of fully imitating
the competent Mayor’s choices (concerning now both t and ) and be re-elected
for sure, or deviate, playing his preferred strategy, and being defeated at the
elections 9. But as explained in the Introduction, in the Italian context is more
natural to assume that the citizen observes , the total personal income tax she
pays, but she is unable to distinguish between T and t: Notice that this then
o￿ers the incompetent Mayor a further possibility for pooling; he can use his
superior knowledge about the move of the Central government to pretend that
a di￿erent T has been chosen, and use the extra revenue he can then collect
from the income tax to reduce the e￿ort he has to make in order to imitate the
competent Mayor. Intuitively, this should make pooling easier. In the rest of
this section, we investigate under which conditions this occurs.
Let us then suppose that while the consumer cannot observe the move of
the Central government, she has some expectations about this move. In partic-
ular, suppose that the consumer expects the central government to set in the
￿rst period a high tax rate T with probability  and a low tax rate T with
probability 1 , where T > T > 010. For simplicity, in what follows, we study
only the case where   1
2
11.
8The Italian reform did not involve an o￿setting reduction in transfers (see below). This
was so because the surcharge tax was an opportunity, not an obligation, for municipalities.
Notice also that the surcharge could not become a subsidy, implying t  0:
9See the Appendix 1 for a full derivation of this case.
10As an interpretation, one may think that the central government needs to supply a separate
(not modeled here) national public good and that the cost of providing this public good is
subject to a technological shock, with a negative shock occurring with ex ante probability
. Assuming that the central government is benevolent and that it does not care for local
government choices, it will then set up a high tax rate when the shock is negative and a low
one when the shock is positive. If the shock is not observable by citizens, we then get the
situation described in the text.
11Our main result below, that the incompetent politician may prefer to play the partial
9To solve the model, we again work backwards. In the second period, as
there are no electoral incentives, a Mayor of type s; when faced with a central
government income tax rate T, would then choose (t;e;) so as to





1 = H() + tL(T + t) + e (17)
The solutions to this problem implicitly determine the optimal choices of
government as a function of the two parameters of the problem, s and T:
(s;T);t(s;T);e(s;T): As shown in the Appendix, the SOC conditions for a
local maximum are certainly satis￿ed if both elasticities are strictly increasing
in their prices (e.g. "l
() > 0 and "h
() > 0) and these conditions are also
enough to sign unambiguously the e￿ect of a change in s on the optimal choices
of the government: @(s;T)=@s > 0;@t(s;T)=@s > 0;@e(s;T)=@s < 0. The
e￿ect of a small change in T on the optimal choices of the local government is
instead generally ambiguous 12.
Substituting back these optimal choices in the objective function, we ob-
tain the maximum utility that a government of type s could get, by solving
the maximization problem above, when the central tax rate is T, w(T;s) =
u((s;T);t(s;T);T)+E  s
2(e(s;T))2 . Di￿erentiating the FOC for problem
(16) and invoking the envelope theorem, it is easy to check that @w(T;s)=@T <
0;both types are worse o￿ when the central government sets up a higher tax
rate13. This will be useful below.
2.5.1 The partial pooling strategy
Consider then the ￿rst period. As anticipated, the basic di￿erence with respect
to the previous section is in terms of the strategies that the incompetent Mayor
can now play. As in the previous section, he can still play his preferred strategies





and be defeated at the elections, or he can still play the fully pooling strategies




). But he can now
also play a partial pooling strategy, exploiting his superior knowledge about the
central government’s move to pretend instead that a di￿erent choice about T has
pooling strategy in the ￿rst period, could go through even for   1
2 (when the central
government sets T = T ). But the conditions to support this as an equilibrium would be
considerably more restrictive than in the case studied into the text. Details are available by
the authors on request.
12As is well known by the literature on vertical externalities (e.g. Keen, 1998), an increase
in the national tax rate may reduce or increase the local tax rate on the same tax base,
depending on if the two tax rates are strategically substitute or complements. Our theoretical
results below do not depend on this sign, but the empirical speci￿cation implicitly assumes
@=@T = @t(T;s)=@T + 1 > 0, a rather innocuous assumption.
13Intuitively, if central government raises its tax rate, the consumers are worse o￿ (because
taxes are higher) and both types of Mayor need to o￿er more e￿ort to compensate for the
change. Hence, both elements in w(T;s) fall as T rises.
10been made. Notice that the incompetent Mayor, if he lies about T, pretending
that e T instead has occurred (where T 6= e T ), needs to lie consistently. In
particular, he needs to set the observable tax variables, that is,  and ; at the
level which would be set by a competent Mayor facing a central income tax rate
equal to e T. Otherwise, the consumer would immediately understand that the
Mayor is incompetent and vote him out of o￿ce at the ensuing elections.
Suppose then that the central government has set T in the ￿rst period. If
the incompetent Mayor pretends instead that T has been played, he must select
the surcharge tax e t so that:
e t = T   T + t(s;T) (18)
by the same token, he must also select the property tax at the same level
it would be chosen by the competent Mayor if the central government had
selected T , (s;T): By the government budget constraint, the e￿ort level the
incompetent Mayor need to o￿er by playing the partial pooling strategy can be
readily computed as14:
e e = 1   e tL(T + t(s;T))   (s;T)H((s;T)) (19)
e e = 1 t(s;T)L(T +t(s;T)) (s;T)H((s;T)) (T  T)L(T +t(s;T)) (20)
Which ￿nally implies:
e(s;T)   e e = (T   T)L(T + t(s;T)) > 0 (21)
In words, if the incompetent Mayor pretends that T has been played, while
in fact T was played, the level of e￿ort that he needs to make to support the
choices that a competent government would do had T been played is reduced by
an amount equal to (T  T)L(T +t(s;T)), the extra revenue on the labor income
that the incompetent Mayor can appropriate in order to keep the pretence that
T was in fact played and he (the incompetent Mayor) is a competent one. Let us
also de￿ne with  w2(T) = u((s;T);t(s;T);T)  s
2(e(s;T))2 w(T;s) < 0
the ￿rst period loss that the incompetent Mayor would su￿er by playing the
fully pooling strategy when the central tax rate is T. Using this expression, the
utility loss for the incompetent Mayor in the ￿rst period if he plays the partial
pooling strategy and pretends T = T while T = T was in fact chosen, call it
 e w2(T;T); can be written as:
 e w2(T;T) =  w2(T) + (w(s;T)   w(s;T)) +
s
2
((e(s;T))2   e e2) (22)
14Notice that as we assumed that e￿ort cannot become negative (the Mayor cannot cash
the extra revenue as private consumption), for the incompetent Mayor to be able to play the
partial pooling strategy we need to assume that e e  0, that is, e(s;T)  (T  T)L(T +t(s;T)):
11The expression is intuitive. By pretending T = T when in fact T = T
and playing in the ￿rst period the same choices a competent government would
have made at T = T , the incompetent Mayor su￿ers in the ￿rst period the
same loss he would incur by imitating the competent government when T = T,
expressed by ( w2(T)), plus the extra loss deriving by the fact that he could
have played his optimal choices for T rather than his optimal choices for T.
As w(s; T) < w(s; T), the ￿rst two terms in the expression above are certainly
negative. In exchange of these losses, however, the incompetent Mayor can now
cash the extra revenue obtained by lying in form of reduced e￿ort, e(s;T)   e e,
which give him an extra utility equal to s
2((e(s;T))2   (e e)2) > 0.
Subtracting  w2(T) from  e w2(T;T), it follows that if the condition
() w2(T)   e w2(T;T) > 0 (23)
is satis￿ed the incompetent Mayor is better o￿, in terms of ￿rst period losses,
by playing the partial pooling strategy rather than the fully pooling one. In the
Appendix we prove
Lemma 1 If types are su￿ciently close, () is violated, if types are su￿ciently
apart, () is satis￿ed.
Intuitively, if (s   s) is smaller than a given threshold, the fully pooling
strategy is not very costly for the incompetent Mayor, and the extra revenue
which he could get by lying does not compensate for the extra utility loss which
he su￿ers by pretending that T was played. The opposite is true if the di￿erence
between s and s is large.
2.5.2 Equilibria with the surcharge tax on income
Of course, even if condition () is satis￿ed, this is still not a su￿cient condition
for the incompetent government to be willing to play the partial pooling strategy.
This also depends on the probability of being re-elected if he plays this strategy.
At a partial pooling equilibrium, the rational consumer will of course be able to
predict correctly the equilibrium strategy of the incompetent government. This
implies, by Bayes’ rule, that upon observing  = T + t(s;T) and  = (s;T),




q + (1   q)(1   )
(24)
it follows that the consumer will re-elect the incompetent government if
(;)  q or if   1
2;which in our case holds by assumption. Finally, the
incompetent government will play the partial pooling equilibrium rather than





where  is the expectation operator and where expectations are taken upon
the realization of T in the second period. Notice that providing that the con-
dition () is satis￿ed and   k3(T); playing the partial pooling strategy is
the best strategy for the incompetent Mayor. There is no reasons to deviate
and play the fully pooling strategy instead because, whatever the beliefs of the
consumer upon observing  = T + t(s;T) and  = (s;T), this cannot give
the incompetent government a better chance of re-election and furthermore, the
fully pooling strategy produces a higher ￿rst period loss; and there is no reason
to play his preferred strategy, as this would lead to sure loss at the elections,
and the condition   k3(T) guarantees that the ￿rst period loss of the partial
pooling strategy are dominated by the future expected bene￿ts.
Consider next the opposite case, where that the central government has set
T in the ￿rst period. In this case, the partial pooling strategy is clearly a
dominated strategy for the incompetent Mayor. In fact, by Bayes’ rule,   1
2
implies that the incompetent Mayor would not be re-elected by playing the
partial pooling strategy in this case; realizing that, the incompetent Mayor
would then be better o￿ by playing his preferred strategy in the ￿rst period
too. In turn, this means that when the central government chooses T, then the
incompetent Mayor has only two choices. Playing his preferred strategy in the
￿rst period too, and being defeated for sure, or playing the fully pooling strategy
and being reelected for sure (given our assumptions above). The Appendix
proves that the incompetent Mayor will prefer to pool by playing the fully





We are now in a position to summarize the results of our analysis, deriving
all the perfect Bayesian equilibria (in pure strategies) of our game. Repeating
all our previous arguments (see the Appendix 1 for a more detailed proof) leads
to the following
Proposition 2 Consider a two period economy, where local governments can
select both the property tax and a surcharge on the income tax base. Suppose the
citizen does not observe the labor tax rate selected by the national government
but expects that the higher tax rate will be selected with probability   1
2. Pro-
viding that the two types of Mayor are su￿ciently apart, so that condition ()
is satis￿ed, if the national government selects T and   k3(T), there exists a
partial pooling equilibrium in pure strategies where the incompetent Mayor plays
in the ￿rst period the corresponding strategies of the competent Mayor for the
case T = T. If the national government selects T and   k2(T) there exists a
fully pooling equilibrium in pure strategies, where the incompetent Mayors just
replicates the choices of the competent one in the ￿rst period. If either the na-
tional government selects T and  < k3(T) or the national government selects
T and  < k2(T), there exist separating equilibria where the incompetent Mayor
13just selects his preferred choices in the ￿rst period. At both the fully pooling
equilibrium or at the partial pooling equilibrium, both types of government will
be re-elected for sure. At the separating equilibria, the competent Mayor will be
re-elected, and the incompetent Mayor defeated, at the ensuing elections.
3 Interpretation and empirical predictions
The main theoretical result of the paper is contained in the following corollary,
which derives directly from Proposition 2:
Corollary 1 The set of values of  which supports pooling equilibria when the
move by the central government is observable by citizens is a proper subset of
the set of values of  which supports pooling equilibria when the move by the
central government is not observable by citizens
Proof 1 This follows directly by the observation that k2(T) > k3(T):
Intuitively, the surcharge rate on PIT, which can only be imperfectly ob-
served by citizens, o￿ers incompetent Mayors a less costly way to imitate the
competent ones, and this is re￿ected in a larger set of parameters supporting
pooling equilibria. Hence, the reduction in accountability induced by the sur-
charge rate reduces the ability of citizens to distinguish between competent and
incompetent local politicians. Note further, by comparing the equation de￿ning
k1(T) (equation 15) and the equation above de￿ning k2(T);that k1(T)  k2(T)
is also at least likely15. By a revealed preference argument, the expected utility
of being re-elected is certainly at least as large when the Mayor can introduce
a surcharge tax on income than when he cannot (as the Mayor can always set
this surcharge equal to zero, so replicating the choice without the surcharge),
implying that the denominator in the equation de￿ning k2(T) is at least as
large as the denominator in the equation de￿ning k1(T): Hence, unless w2(T)
is also larger than w1(T) (and there is no reason why this should be generally
the case), we should also expect k2(T) to be smaller than k1(T). The general
conclusion is that the introduction of the surcharge tax should make pooling
equilibria more likely after the reform than before it.
On empirical grounds, the model then produces several predictions. First,
we should observe a general reduction of the tax rate on the property tax fol-
lowing the introduction of the surcharge tax on income, as some Municipalities
substitute the property tax for the income tax (a straightforward consequence
of Ramsey’s rule). Second, however, this reduction should be more pronounced
for ￿rst term Mayors who still have electoral incentives than for second term
15In the equation de￿ning K1;for simplicity, we did not consider the dependence of K1
on the realization of . Observe that  = T when the local government cannot introduce a
surcharge tax. Reintroducing it and considering the uncertainty surrounding the choice of T
by the central government in the second period, the comparative static argument discussed
into the text becomes obvious.
14ones16. Third, the replacement ratio of Mayors should be lower after the reform
than before it17. Finally, if ￿rst term Mayors are able to predict that following
the reform is easier to be re-elected, we should also observe more incumbent
Mayors willing to run again after the reform than before it 18. In the follow-
ing, we take these predictions to data. But before doing it, we ￿rst outline the
institutions and describe our data set.
4 Institutions and data set
4.1 Local taxes
Municipal ￿nance in Italy has been historically characterized by a large share
of the ￿nancial needs being covered by grants from the central governments.
Because of the several ine￿ciencies that this system created, several steps were
taken in the 90’s to increase local tax autonomy. Property tax rate was estab-
lished in 1992 and applied to real estate. The tax base is determined essentially
on cadastral income and revised only rarely 19. The range of municipal property
tax rates is restricted to lie in the interval from a minimum of 0.4% up to a
maximum of 0.7% . As for tax allowances, municipalities can introduce speci￿c
tax rates and deductions for resident owners only 20. As a result of this latter
distinction, each municipality is allowed to levy two distinct property tax rates,
one called the ordinary or business tax rate, and the other devoted to main res-
idence only. We will come back to this below. In our sample, business property
tax produced approximately 70% of the total property tax revenue.
The Municipal Personal Income Surcharge (PIT surcharge, from now on) was
introduced in 1998 essentially as a tool to give local municipalities a more elastic
source of revenues, given the rigidity of the property tax base, and to increase
their tax autonomy. Its base is the total taxable income for the national income
tax (PIT) declared by residents of the municipality. As already anticipated in
the Introduction, the range of the PIT surcharge goes from a minimum of 0%
up to a maximum of 0.5%, but municipalities were forced to spread the increase
of the rates to attain the maximum in at least three years, or to a maximum
of 0.2% per year. However, a freeze on the PIT surcharge was imposed by the
national government in 2003 to be relaxed again in 2007. In the following, we
exploit this variation in our analysis.
16Besley and Case (1995a) uses term limit as an identifying strategy for the agency model
of politics described above. Bordignon et al. (2003) use the same strategy for the Italian
municipal context, ￿nding strong support for the hypothesis.
17To get this prediction explicitly from our theoretical results is enough to assume that the
discount rate  has some distribution across the population of Mayors. As k falls following the
reform, we should observe more pooling behavior and hence more Mayors being re-elected.
18Strictly speaking, we have not modelled a decision to run or not run again in the previous
sections. But notice that deviating and playing the separating strategy in the ￿rst period
could be interpreted as a choice not to run again, as it would lead to a sure defeat in our
model.
19In the period we consider there was only a major adjustment, an across-the-board 5%
increase in the tax base of the property tax in 1997.
20A ￿xed sum across municipalities from 1993 to 1996, a variable sum, that can be de￿ned
di￿erently by each municipality for di￿erent personal characteristics of house owners, from
1996 onwards.
15Table 1: Structure of revenues
In % of total revenues 1998 2006 In % of own revenues 1998 2006
Own revenues (a) 37,3 32,8 Property tax 44,5 45,0
Grants and other current transf. 25,9 23,1 Pit surcharge - 7,8
Rev. from Fees and User Charges 17,0 15,9 Other taxes(b) 33,7 27,4
Capital revenues 19,8 28,1 Other taxes(c) 21,7 19,8
Obs. 1062 1206 1178 1206
(a):property tax and pit surcharge. Minor revenues from billposting fees
(b):waste treatment, revenues from occupancy of public areas
(c):fees and charges from individual demand services
Table 1 presents the overall structure of local revenues, drawn from our
￿nancial dataset, for the municipalities in our sample (better detailed below).
Transfers from the upper levels of government cover only about 1/4 of total
revenue, fees and user charges about 16%. The rest is made up by taxes and
capital revenues, with a sharp increase of the latter in the period, from 20% in
1998 to 28% in 2006. Tax revenues are composed mainly of property tax revenue
(44,5% of the total own revenues in 1998 and 45% in 2006) and revenues from
taxes on waste treatment and fees from chargeable public goods (nearly 55%
on total own revenues in 1998 and 47% in 2006). In 2006, the PIT surcharge
accounted for about 8% of tax revenue in 2006 (it was of course zero in 1998).
Figure 1: Timing of Elections and Municipal accounting process
In ￿gure 1 we sketch the timing of tax choices. Generally all municipalities
16make their resolutions on tax rates relative to ￿scal year t from October of year
t 1 to April of year t. Di￿erently from property tax revenues, which is directly
paid to municipalities, PIT surcharge revenues are transferred from the central
government to municipalities after the completion of a process of assessment
and collection at the central level, hence with some delay (generally one to two
years). As for the timing of the decisions on the two tax rates, as we can
observe in ￿gure 1, the process is not simultaneous, and it does not overlap
with electoral dates (Dt 1 to Dt+i in ￿gure 1) which are generally held in May
or June. Property tax rate for year t is usually set during ￿scal year t , while
the PIT surcharge is generally set at year t   1 for ￿scal year t.
4.2 Local electoral system
The electoral system of Italian municipalities was reformed in 1993, with the
introduction of the direct election of the Mayors, wiping away a long tradition
of indirect elections of Mayors via proportional election of the council. Elected
Mayors carry with them the majority of their council (the lists supporting the
Mayors receive a prize in terms of seats in the council, which ensures the Mayor
a strong majority). If a Mayor loses the con￿ance of the council, he has to
resign, but in that case new elections need take place. This had the e￿ect of
increasing the stability of municipal governments, a sharp di￿erence with the
pre-reform case where the council frequently changed Mayors between elections.
Under the new regime a Mayor is elected for a 4-year time span; in 2000, this
interval was further extended to ￿ve years. Mayors cannot run for more than
one term after the ￿rst, and to be re-elected again they have to stay out for one
or more legislatures. All Mayors in charge at the time of the reform (1993) were
not considered as such for the computation of the terms, so that they could run
again for two terms irrespective of the time they had already been in o￿ce prior
of the reform.
4.3 Fiscal and political data
We exploit the entire set of Piedmont municipalities balance sheets, containing
local ￿nancial data, from 1998 to 2006. Piedmont have 1206 municipalities with
a total population of nearly 4,5 million. 1074 municipalities have less then 5000
inhabitants while only 44 have more than 15000 inhabitants. Along with ￿nan-
cial data, we collected data relative to elections and other political variables.
Our political dataset is composed of Piedmont municipal elections from 1997 to
200621. We built this dataset from the Italian Interior Ministry O￿cial Report
on Municipal Elections, which collects and makes available extensive data start-
ing from 1997. For each municipality we also gathered some socio-demographic
variables, some time-invariant and other time-varying, that we use below as
controls in our regressions. Table 2 describes these variables. Notice that we
introduce a variable which captures the touristic vocation of the municipality
(this may be important, because touristic municipality usually have more vaca-
tion houses which are subjected to the business property tax with no allowance)
and another which captures the "rigidity" of the expenditure side of the budget
21We have only partial data on 2006 elections.
17Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Proportion overall 0,27 0,62 0,004 8,66
of people between 0,62 0,004 8,66
employed in tourism(a) within 0 0,27 0,27
Grants overall 237,16 187,65 0,16 3082,89
per between 172,93 42,45 1457,14
capita(c) within 71,89 -597,94 1939,81
Other overall 181,95 268,54 0,046 9452,18
revenues between 234,36 18,95 2715,53
from tax. and tarif.(c) within 128,57 -1513,12 6918,59
Rigid overall 270,48 155,41 0 2009,47
exp. between 148,13 40,39 1564,44
per cap(b,c) within 46,20 -383,59 814,71
Municipal overall 13169,14 2755,54 2697,58 31746,47
per capita between 2522,59 4153,22 28105,26
Income(c) within 1110,96 8080,12 26729,55
Prop. overall 0,11 0,02 0,008 0,21
young between 0,02 0,018 0,18
aged (0-15) within 0,009 0,025 0,17
Prop. overall 0,25 0,066 0,08 0,67
elderly between 0,064 0,10 0,63
(aged 65+) within 0,012 0,17 0,33
Population overall 3558,12 26538,71 43 909717
between 26539,14 46,88 890274,3
within 605,67 -29283,21 23000,79
Observations: 10854 Municipalities:1206 Years: 9
(a) on total employed people
(b) sum of personnel and debt service exp.
(c) current euro per capita
(expenditure on personell and debt interests expressed in per capita term) as
this may also a￿ect tax decisions.
4.4 Descriptive statistics
In this section we present some descriptive statistics, pertaining to the main
predictions of our model we intend to test.
Table 3 provides some evidence on the evolution of the di￿erent tax rates in
the period 1993-2006 for our sample. As is clear from the table, municipalities
were increasingly using their available room on the business and main residence
18Table 3: Annual % growth of mean values of Property and PIT tax rates.
Piedmontese municipalities
Year Main Resid. Business PIT N. munic. using PIT
1994 4,7 4,7 -
1995 1,4 1,5 -
1996 2,8 3,4 -
1997 0,9 2,2 -
1998 0,9 1,9 -
1999* 0,1 1,1 * 381
2000 1,0 2,6 38,3 668
2001 0,5 1,5 26,6 777
2002 0,6 1,4 11,3 843
2003 -2,8 0,9 0,4 847
2004 3,3 0,8 -0,5 851
2005 0,7 1,5 -4,3 898
2006 0,2 0,9 -1,7 919
*In 1999 the mean pit surcharge rate increased from 0 level to 0,182%.
property tax rate, with always increasing average tax rates in the period 1993-
1999. The introduction of the PIT surcharge in 1999 allowed them to partially
substitute the income tax for the property tax, reducing the rate of growth of
the property tax rates and in some cases (as in 2003) by making it negative.
Interestingly, the trade o￿ appears to be particular strong between the PIT
surcharge and the Main Residence Property tax, which is paid only by the
municipal residents and therefore by people who certainly are eligible as voters
in the municipal elections22. As shown in the table, the average rate of growth
of the PIT surcharge rate was very large in the ￿rst years following the reform,
to fall (as a joint e￿ect of the PIT rate freeze and the increasing number of
municipalities using it for the ￿rst time at a lower rate) after the freeze decided
by the national government in 2003 23.
Table 4: Correlation between changes in Property and PIT tax rates in di￿erent
sub-samples. Piedmont municipalities
Change in Business Prop. tax
Overall sample Inc. reelect. Defeat. Inc. reelect. Defeat.
1999-2006 1999-2006 1999-2006 1999-2003 1999-2003
Change in Pit tax 0,0669 -0,039 0,060 -0,059 0,056
Obs. 9645 1008 94 712 63
*** p < 0:01, ** p < 0:05, * p < 0:1
Table 4 and 5 provide some evidence of the correlation between municipals’
property tax changes (for both the resident and the business tax) and PIT
22The business property tax is paid by second house owners and by owners (citizens and
￿rms) of commercial and industrial estate. The latter therefore may or may not be voters in
the municipalities where they pay the business property tax.
23The freeze allowed those municipalities that had never used the PIT surcharge tax before
2003 to introduce it after, while for the others, they could maintain the PIT surcharge at the
level that they had already chosen, but could not increase it further. More precisely, in the
period from 2004 to 2006, municipalities that had not made use of the PIT surcharge before,
could introduce it at a constrained rate of 0,1% per ￿scal year.
19Table 5: Correlation between changes in Property and PIT tax rates in di￿erent
sub-samples. Piedmont municipalities
Change in Main resid. Prop. tax
Overall sample Inc. reelect. Defeat. Inc. reelect. Defeat.
1999-2006 1999-2006 1999-2006 1999-2003 1999-2003
Change in Pit tax 0,0036 -0,068 -0,070 -0,135* -0,087
Obs. 9645 1008 94 712 63
*** p < 0:01, ** p < 0:05, * p < 0:1
Table 6: Incumbents statistics
years 1 2 3 4 5=34 6=(52)/1
Number of Number % of Incumbents % of First Term Con￿rmed inc.
elections of First who have inc. who have run who have run
Term incumb. run again again and won and won the el.
1993 109 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 52,3%
1994 34 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 26,5%
1995 1006 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 56,1%
1996 27 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 18,5%
1997 120 119 70,6% 82,1% 58,0% 57,5%
1998 43 40 72,5% 89,7% 65,0% 60,5%
1999 961 912 84,3% 85,9% 72,5% 68,8%
2000 35 30 76,7% 87,0% 66,7% 57,1%
2001 130 68 72,1% 77,6% 55,9% 29,2%
2002 67 31 67,7% 85,7% 58,1% 26,9%
2003 21 18 61,1% 100,0% 61,1% 52,3%
2004 943 351 76,9% 83,7% 64,4% 24,0%
2005 43 17 64,7% 81,8% 52,9% 20,9%
2006 137 102 81,7% 77,7% 63,5% 53,3%
surcharge tax changes from 1999 to 2006. For the entire sample, we observe a
positive and signi￿cant correlation between the one year change in the business
property tax rates and one year change in the PIT surcharge rates. However, if
we restrict our sample only to the incumbent Mayors who ran again and were re-
elected, our data show a negative correlation between the PIT surcharge and the
business property tax (-0,039). The correlation becomes instead positive when
observations are limited to incumbents who ran again and were defeated. Notice
also that the coe￿cients maintain the sign, and the correlation is more intense,
when we restrict the analysis to the 1999-2003 subsample (-0,059). This is as
expected as the government freeze reduced the possibility for municipalities to
use the PIT surcharge after 2003. The same pattern emerges for the correlation
between the main residence property tax rate and PIT surcharge (table 5). If
the case of correlation between one-year changes in main residence property tax
and PIT surcharge we observe a stronger negative coe￿cient in all subsamples,
notably during the restricted 1999-2003 subsample.
Table 6 looks instead to incumbents and replacement rates. According to
our model, the 1998 reform should have made easier for low quality Mayors
to "hide" their quality, at least until the 2003 national freeze. Accordingly, we
would expect a higher probability of re-election for this pool of candidates in the
period 1998-2003 and a reduction after. As potential candidates might have also
anticipated that is easier to be re-elected after the reform, we may also expect
a rise in the fraction of ￿rst term incumbents that decided to run again in the
same period. Table 6 presents some preliminary evidence on these predictions.
Column 1 gives the number of elections for each year, column 2 the number
of ￿rst term incumbents in those elections, column 3 the percentage of ￿rst
20term incumbents who decided to re-run, column 4 the percentage of ￿rst term
incumbents who, having decided to re-run, won the elections. Finally, column
5 give the percentage of ￿rst term incumbents who run and won the elections,
the product of column 3 and 4. For the years preceding 1997 we do not have
detailed information on Mayors, but we can observe the ones who run and were
re-elected 24. In column 6, accordingly, we compute the percentage of con￿rmed
incumbents for the entire period.
The table provides some preliminary evidence on our predictions. As the
table shows, most elections took place in 1995, 1999 and in 2004. Comparing
1999 with 1995, we observe a sharp increase in the number of incumbents who
were con￿rmed at the elections, from 56% in 1995 to 69% in 1999. This is in
line with one of our prediction, as in 1999 Mayors could use the PIT surcharge
and indeed about 40% of them actually did so (see the last column in Table 3).
Comparing 1999 with 2004, where we have more data, we ￿rst notice that the
percentage of ￿rst term incumbents who decided to run again is higher in 1999
than in 2004, 84% against 77%. This is again in favour of our predictions, if we
assume that incumbents, predicting that it is easier to be re-elected when the
PIT is in place, are more willing to run. Among the ￿rst term incumbents who
decided to re-run, 86% were re-elected in 1999, when the reform was in place,
where a slightly smaller number, 84%, were re-elected in 2004, when the national
government’s freeze had eliminated for most municipalities the possibibility to
use the PIT surcharge. This is again, although weakly, in accordance with our
predictions.
5 Empirical analysis
We now investigate our data set in more details, testing each hypothesis one by
one. We begin with our predictions about the tax rates.
5.1 Tax rates setting
We begin by postulating that the local choice for the property tax rate in mu-
nicipality i at period t is a function of six variables:
it = f (tit;Yit;Dit;it;X0
it;ci;) (27)
In the equation it;tit are respectively the property tax rate and the PIT
surcharge tax rate, Dit are electoral dummies relative to ￿rst and second term
electoral rounds for incumbents , Yit stands for local per capita revenues from
fees and tari￿s, it for per capita grants accruing from other level of govern-
ments, X0
it stands for other socio economic determinants of property tax setting
and ci stands for unobservable components at the municipal level, possibly cor-
related with one or more variables in the vector of regressors. To X0
it we also
added a speci￿c regressor built on ￿nancial data relative to ￿scal years 1998-
2006 which controls for local expenditures rigidity (see table 2). Since a separate
vector of tax rates or fees for local services (like waste and water services, or
24In this period, we do not know if an incumbent is not re-elected because he decided not
to run, or because he was defeated.
21other minor taxes and fees) is not available, we use as a proxy the sum of per
capita revenues from the di￿erent types of tari￿s and fees revenues. The result
is a single gross endogenous variable Yit, used as a further control with respect
to  and t and comprising all alternative source of own revenues for each munic-
ipality. In the following, this variable will be exploited to test for simultaneity
in the choice of Property Tax and PIT surcharge rates. Grants accruing from
other level of governments are considered exogenous, along with idiosyncratic
socioeconomic characteristics of local municipalities .
The simple model above encompasses many traditional models of tax reac-
tion functions (Besley and Rosen, 1998; Redoano et al., 2007; Esteller-MorØ and
SolØ-OllØ, 2001; Buettner, 2001) at local and state level (Inman, 1989).
In its simplest expression, the model we study is a static linear speci￿cation
of the tax determination formula in semi-logarithmic form 25:
logit = tit + logQit + ci + Dit + t (28)
where ;  and  are parameters, Qit collects all the vector of controls it;X0
it
described in (27) , Dit is our set of political dummies and t is an unobservable
stochastic term. The linear speci￿cation and the additivity between t and other
controls implies of course a restriction on preferences, but we draw here from an
extensive empirical literature dealing with determinants of tax rates to justify
this choice (e.g. Brett and Pinske, 2000; Besley and Rosen, 1998).
Notice that in equation (28) the PIT surcharge is introduced as an exogenous
variable explaining the property tax. But the PIT surcharge itself is of course a
function of the property tax rate in the same period, and it has to be considered
as simultaneously determined with the latter. This is therefore a typical case
in which the OLS estimator is biased. A natural way to cope with simultane-
ity would consist in estimating a simultaneous system of tax setting equations
by instrumental variable methods. Unfortunately, the lack of good exogenous
variables do not allow us to pursue this solution here. We then decided to start
with a di￿erenced OLS speci￿cation of our property tax determination function
above. In a further step, we attempt to take into account the endogeneity of the
PIT tax rate decision using a System GMM estimator for dynamic panel data.
5.1.1 The choice of the property tax rate
Before turning to discussing results, some further comments are useful in order
to justify our choices for the property tax rate variables. For the latter we
do not have any detailed and time-varying ￿gures about the tax base, and
in particular we do not have the speci￿c fractions of liability due to certain
types of properties (residential, industrial or agricultural). This is a problem,
because of course the choice of a tax and relative tax burden may also depend
on the characteristics of the tax base. Furthermore, for the main residence tax,
while we observe both the statutory tax rate and the size of the allowance, we
do not observe the distribution of the latter across resident owners, and are
therefore unable to compute e￿ective tax rates. To address these problems,
we then decided to run regressions using as dependent variable alternatively the
statutory main residence and the business property tax rate. The e￿ective main
25We used a semi-logarithmic form because in many municipalities tit = 0 and we could not
then apply logarithmic transformation with a reasonable interpretation in terms of elasticities
22residence tax would clearly be more in line with the hypotheses of our model,
but it is less precisely observed than the business tax rate (where allowances
cannot be introduced).
5.1.2 Split sample
We begin by following Besley and Case (1995a) that suggested to analyze sep-
arately the sample according to incumbent status. Accordingly, we split our
sample in two parts: the ￿rst is restricted to municipalities ruled by ￿rst term
Mayors who decided to run again and won, the second to municipalities run
by second terms Mayors. Model (28) is then estimated through ￿rst di￿er-
ence estimator, taking into account serial correlation in errors and removing
individual-level e￿ects26. Table 7 presents our results 27. The evidence is clearly
in accordance with our theory. The PIT surcharge has a negative impact on
the property tax for ￿rst term Mayors who decided to run again and won, and
a positive one for second term Mayors, controlling for year e￿ects, municipal
￿xed e￿ects and the other controls. More speci￿cally, the coe￿cients on PIT
surcharge in period 1998-2006 range from -0.023 (see table 7 column 1) to -0.024
(table 7 column 3). This last coe￿cient, signi￿cant at p < 0:1 level, provides
quite a strong support to our theory. Notice also, as expected, that the negative
coe￿cients of the variable of interest for the restricted 1998-2003 period slightly
increases along with statistical signi￿cance. As a further check we also rerun the
same model for the extended sample of all incumbents who run again, without
removing defeated Mayors. The coe￿cient of the PIT surcharge now loses sta-
tistical signi￿cance and also changes sign depending on the speci￿cation we use
28. This is again in line with our expectations as it implies that the observed
negative relationship between the PIT and the property tax tends to be robust
only for incumbents who run again and won.
5.2 Term limit e￿ects: robustness checks
In the preceding tests, the e￿ect of unobservable time-varying trends is only
captured by the inclusion of time dummies, whereas municipal ￿xed e￿ects
cover the heterogeneous time invariant factors that a￿ect tax rate choices. But
this may miss some important time varying e￿ects which we now try to exploit.
In particular, according to our theory, we should expect that only ￿rst term
incumbents who are approaching re-election date will use the more intensely
PIT surcharge to reduce the property rate, while they will not do so in the
years preceding their second term expiring date. This suggests to contrast,
using the term dummies, the tax behavior of ￿rst term candidates with the tax
behavior of second term candidates in the years preceding the elections. We
introduce here also the level of tax allowance for main residence property tax,
treated as an exogenous variable. The only source of identi￿cation here is the
di￿erential e￿ect of term limit, and the sample is restricted only to winning
26In this section, we of course drop the dummy variables Dit as we consider a split sample.
27All estimates have been replicated dropping abnormal observations detected through the
formula x < F25 3IQR or x > F75+3IQR, where F25 and F75 are 25th and 75th percentiles
, x the variable to be trimmed and IQR the interquartile range. Results turn out to be robust
to such restrictions.
28Results available upon request by the authors.
23candidates. We specify and test a modi￿ed version of model (28) using Fixed
E￿ects estimator:
logit = tit + (tit  Dit) +  logx0
it + ci + it (29)
As a variation, we test also for a First Di￿erence (FD) version of the same
model, in order to control for the serial correlation in panel errors:
logit = tit + (tit  Dit) + logx0
it + it (30)
with it and tit respectively property tax rate and pit surcharge rates as
above. D is splitted into DI
it and DII
it , respectively ￿rst term dummy and
binding term limit dummy.
Results of the estimations of the two models are collected in table 8. As
expected, the negative adjustment of the property tax rate is higher near the
re-election date for candidates who run again and win, while there is no such
e￿ect near the last year in charge for lame ducks. The e￿ect of the PIT surcharge
on the property tax turns out to be negative in all the estimations, but it is again
more relevant when the dependent variable is the main residence property tax
rate. More speci￿cally, observe in column 1, where we collect the result of the
FD version of the model with the main residence tax as dependent variable,
that the e￿ect of PIT surcharge interacted with re-election dummy is negative
(-0.016) and signi￿cant, while the e￿ect of the surcharge interacted with the
expiring term election dummy is positive and not signi￿cant. In column 3, the
same FD estimator is applied to the business property tax rate. Again ( titDI)
has the expected, positive, sign, while the sign is reversed for the ( tit  DII)
variable, although both coe￿cients turn out to be not signi￿cant. The results
for the FE estimator, reported in columns 2 for the main residence property
tax and in column 4 for the business tax rate, show again the expected sign for
(tit  DI) although they are not signi￿cant.
5.3 Endogeneity issues
A potentially serious problem with the previous analysis is that the PIT sur-
charge is treated as exogenous, while we know this is not the case. We have to
consider also endogeneity of municipal tax allowances levels for main residence
tax rates. In this section, we try to cope with the endogeneity problem by using
the System GMM estimation strategies proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995)
(see also Blundell and Bond (1998)). In practice, as our panel data set su￿ered
from lack of good exogenous candidates, we rely upon the lag structure of our
dependent and independent variables to build a matrix Z 29 of suitable instru-
ments to gain identi￿cation (and overidenti￿cation) of parameters of interest.




j logit j+(tit  Dit)+logYit+logX0
it+logit+t+ci+it
(31)
with i = 1;:::;N and t = 1;:::;T in (31).
29See Appendix 2 for a de￿nition of this matrix.
24Variables are speci￿ed as in (30), and we also add here municipal-speci￿c
time invariant e￿ects (ci) and time-speci￿c e￿ects (t). We also introduce the
lag of the dependent variable that we interpret here as a constraint faced by
each municipality in taking the decision for each ￿nancial year and the level of
tax allowance for main residence property tax. Table 10 presents our preferred
estimations using as dependent variable the business and main residence prop-
erty rate. Estimates of (31) via system GMM estimator include all explanatory
variables entering without lags. We report also (table 9, column 1 to 4) the
same speci￿cation used for system-GMM estimators using OLS and FE estima-
tors to provide the lower and upper bound for the autoregressive coe￿cients
of property tax rates (business and main residence rates) 30.Our model takes
as completely endogenous the lag of the dependent variable it j, variable Yit
and tax allowances for main residence tax rates, while the electoral dummies
interacted with PIT surcharge are considered as predetermined. 31
We expect a signi￿cant and negative e￿ect of PIT surcharge interacted with
￿rst term year dummy. The idea here is that in the year Mayors were elected
for a second time, the PIT surcharge should have been larger, thus allowing
for a larger reduction in the property tax. On the contrary, we do not expect
a signi￿cant correlation of the PIT surcharge for the year in which Mayors
were near to the expiring date of their second term. The empirical analysis
supports these a-priori. We observe (table 10 column 3) that the coe￿cient for
PIT surcharge rate interacted with ￿rst term dummy is -0.023, when dependent
variable is main residence property tax rate and -0.018 for business property
tax rate. The PIT surcharge rate interacted with second term dummy (the
incoming expiring year of second term mandate) turns out instead to be not
signi￿cant.
We also use the 2003 freeze in our estimations. Our a-priori is that in the
sub period 1998-2003 the e￿ect of the introduction of the new tax instrument on
property tax rate would work more intensely. In our restricted sample model,
the coe￿cients for our variable of interest do not show an increase in magnitude
and the e￿ect on business and main property rate is similar and less signi￿cant
(columns 2 and 4 table 10). Note also that the test statistics for serial corre-
lation (AR 2) and overidentifying restriction test (Sargan test) do not indicate
serious problems of misspeci￿cation for all the four models estimated for busi-
ness property tax rates, except for estimates in column 4, where second-order
autocorrelation test presents a p-value of 0.093.
5.4 Robustness tests: votes’ margin and the 2004 freeze
Our empirical evidence so far thus tends to con￿rm the predictions concerning
the tax rates. Two main factors however might a￿ect these results. First,
municipalities were constrained to use not more than 0,2 % rate per year of the
PIT surcharge; this means that the impact of the reform was necessarily limited
in 1999, the year where most elections took place. Second, as explained above
(see table 6), as an e￿ect of the 1993 electoral reform, most candidates in 1999
30Notice that although the system GMM estimator is asymptotically more e￿cient, standard
error estimations from the two-step covariance estimation tend to be severely downward biased
. Hence we used the bias-correction method for ￿nite sample covariance matrix derived by
Windmeijer (2005) throughout all estimates.
31See, again, Appendix 2 for details.
25were ￿rst term incumbents. This could also confound the e￿ect of the interaction
of the PIT surcharge with the Mayor’s political status. In this section, as a
further test of our theory, we then attempt a di￿erent empirical strategy. First,
we exploit the margin of victory of running incumbents in the previous elections.
We might expect that incumbents who had barely won against a challenger
and decided to rerun for another term, would act more intensely on the PIT
surcharge to reduce the property tax rate, as they were likely to be more severely
contested at the ensuing elections. Accordingly, we then distinguish ￿rst term
incumbents in respectively "safe" and "unsafe" Mayors, depending on if they
had won the previous elections with a margin above (respectively, below) 1/3
of votes with respect to their main opponent 32(see Table 11). Second, we focus
on the 2004 elections only, where there were less ￿rst term incumbents, and
where we could possibly observe a larger e￿ect of the PIT surcharge on the
property tax. The idea here is that unsafe Mayors would use the PIT surcharge
to reduce the property tax rates not only during the electoral dates but also in
the preceding years, so as to avoid the short-run e￿ect of the legal constraint
on the maximum yearly change allowed by the legislation.
Furthermore, recall that in 2003 the central government imposed an unex-
pected freeze on the PIT surcharge. This implies that municipalities in 2004
could no longer use the PIT surcharge or could only use it a constrained tax rate
(0,1%). This should also take into account any possibly remaining endogeneity
problems in our previous regressions. In fact, if all the bulk of the e￿ect of PIT
surcharge in 2004 year could be attributed to increasing pressure due to bud-
getary conditions, or institutional or demand driven pressures on expenditure
decisions not fully captured by our time dummies or socio-economic controls,
the 2004 unexpected shock, homogeneously spread throughout municipalities,
would have been compensated by other sources of revenue as well. We should
therefore observe a relevant and signi￿cant e￿ect of the interaction of other lo-
cal tax instruments with re-election dummies on property rates. If, viceversa,
we observe this e￿ect only with the PIT surcharge and only with unsafe May-
ors running again, this implicitly supports our theory, namely that the PIT was
used exactly because it was a less transparent instrument than other ￿scal tools.
To check if this is the case, we then regress (per capita) total accrual tax
revenue from the property tax in 2004 33, R
i , against (per capita) total tax
revenue from the Pit surcharge in the same year, Y t
i ,interacted with a dummy
for rerunning safe and unsafe Mayors, and we then substitute Y
f
i , the (per
capita) total tax revenue from alternative sources, to Y t
i ; to see if this makes a
di￿erence. More precisely, we propose and test the following model
logR
i = log(Y k
i  Ui) + Ui + logX0
i + i (32)
logR
i = log(Y k
i  Si) + Si + logX0
i + i (33)
where U (resp. S) is the dummy for unsafe Mayors (resp. safe Mayors),
32Results are robust to the choice of di￿erent thresholds.
33Only from 2006 onward we have data relative to di￿erent revenues stemming from ordinary
and main residence property taxes.
26X0
i is our vector of control and k = t;f:34. Results are reported in tables 12
and 13. In table 12, we presents the result for our 2004 cross section, where we
estimate the e￿ect of Y t
i interacted with re-election dummies on R
i . As can be
seen, the sign of our ￿rst term dummy interacted with Pit surcharge for unsafe
incumbents (U  Y t
i ) is as expected negative (column 1), and the coe￿cient
is both large -0.075 and statistically signi￿cant. On the contrary, the same
interaction for safe incumbents (SR
f
i ) is negative (-0.061) and not signi￿cant
(column 2). The dummy for second term Mayors (II term dummy) is always
positive, although not signi￿cant. In table 13, we replicate the same exercise,
using Y
f
i , the per capita tax revenue for other sources of revenue, in place of
Y t
i . As can be seen, now all interaction terms turn out to be not signi￿cant,
while the dummy for second term incumbent is negative and signi￿cant.
5.5 Probability of winning and running again by incum-
bents
In this section, we ￿nally test the remaining two predictions of our theory, that
both the probability of winning and running again by incumbents should be
larger after the tax reform. Of course, while the choice of the PIT surcharge is a
direct responsability of the incumbents, the probability of winning (or of running
again) may depend by several other factors not considered in our theory. Thus,
we expect somewhat less clear cut results for these predictions. Our empirical
strategy to test them is to estimate separately the probability of running again
and the probability of winning in each electoral round if the incumbent decides
to run again, checking if in the years in which PIT surcharge was available this
made a di￿erence35.
We use data from the Interior Ministry database to construct a record rel-






t0 + it) (34)
if t > 1996.
where Y = 1 if the Mayor runs again, given that he has the possibility
to do it, and Y = 0 if the Mayor does not rerun, conditional on the same
possibility; below we repeat the same exercise, this time de￿ning Y = 1 if the
mayor runs again and wins and Y = 0 if the incumbent runs again and he
is defeated. it is the main residence property tax rate and we expect this
variable to have a (negative) impact on Mayors’ decision to run for another
term and run again and win. In !0
it we collect the vote share of incumbents and
some proxies for the property tax base. We also add a dummy capturing the
speci￿c budgetary situation of those municipalities that, from 2001 onward, were
constrained by compulsory balancing budgetary rules ("Patto di Stabilit￿"),
34We exploit here the fact that, due to time lags in collecting and checking ￿scal records
by the Ministry of Finance, the Pit revenue that is recorded in the 2004 accrual budget of
Municipalities really refers to the decisions taken by Mayors in 2002 or 2003.
35There is already a quite large empirical literature which has addressed similar issues, but
usually focussing on cross-sectional international data or US governors and senate elections
data (see for example Besley and Case, 1995a; Brender, 2003; Besley, 2007). More limited is
the analysis about incumbents re-election probability at local level in non-US countries (see
Revelli, 2008; Sakurai and Menezes-Filho, 2008).
27hence potentially in￿uencing the choice of the property tax. Our parameters of
interests are the years, and in particular the years 1999 and 2004 when most
elections took place (see table 6), remembering that in 1999 the PIT surcharge
was introduced and in 2003 frozen by the national government. In the equation
above 0 indicate the years36. As for the pooled probit equation (33),  is the
standard cumulative distribution function and the model is estimated assuming
independent observations on the same units 37.
The results of this ￿rst speci￿cation are collected in table 14 (all results
are shown in terms of marginal probability e￿ects computed at the regressor
means). They show a positive e￿ect of our year indicators on the probability of
running again in the years after the PIT reform, although the coe￿cients are not
statistically signi￿cant (except for the probit speci￿cation without incumbent
vote shares in previous elections, column 1). Property tax rate is positively
related to the probability of running again, although the coe￿cient turns also
to be not signi￿cant. Since the property tax rate is endogenous to the decision
of running again, we also estimate an instrumental variable probit (table 14,
column 3-4), where we instrumented main residence property tax with a proxy of
local determinants of tax rate (the percentage of holiday residences with respect
to municipal housing stock), with the total value per capita of local property tax
base in 199938 and demographic base. These variables are signi￿cantly related
to the property tax rate but can be thought of as exogenous to the tax rate
setting process of municipalities, as they are not easily manipulable by local
Mayors. The property tax positive coe￿cient is increasing in the instrumental
variable estimate (column 3), but not at a standard level of signi￿cance. There
is some weak support for our model prediction, as in all estimates the 1999
year dummy e￿ect is higher than 2004 year dummy. As a robustness check,
we introduce also the incumbent vote shares in the previous elections, and the
e￿ect of 1999 reform remains higher than 2004 e￿ect. Mayors age, as expected,
turns out to be always negative and highly signi￿cant.
Results for the probability of winning are reported in table 15. Estimates in
column 1 in table 15 show a positive trend of the year dummies, changing sign
in 2006 election year, but again with no statistically signi￿cant coe￿cients. The
property tax rate has the negative expected sign. In column 1 and 2 however we
do no take into account potential endogeneity of property tax rate. In column
3 and 4, we use the same instrumental variable probit estimate we used in table
14 and test for year e￿ect. We observe (column 1 and 3) a con￿rmation of the
trend in the e￿ect of year indicators on the probability of winning: we have an
increase in 1999 and, after the freeze, in 2004, we observe a slight decrease. In
this model, if we control for the e￿ect of vote shares at the previous elections,
the overall e￿ect of 2004 year dummy slightly increases (column 2 and 4). The
strong statistical relevance of incumbents’ previous election vote shares point to
the prevailing e￿ect of ￿rst election popular consensus on subsequent electoral
outcome for running Mayors. Our general conclusion is therefore that the data
shows only limited support for the two remaining implications of the theory.
36In table 13 and 14 below, we only show years indicators’ for 1999, 2004 and 2006, in order
to save space.
37Taking into account corrected standard errors for clustered observations and weighting
according to unequal number of elections each year.
38A ￿gure we derived from Anci, the main municipalities organization.
286 Conclusions
In this paper, we investigated the e￿ects of an Italian reform on the ￿nancing of
municipalities on tax behavior and local politicians turnover. The Italian reform
allowed Mayors to partially substitute a more accountable source of tax revenue
(the property tax) with a less transparent one (a surcharge on the personal
income tax). Theoretical analysis suggests that this should give incompetent
Mayors a less costly way to hide themselves, so allowing them to be more eas-
ily re-elected. An empirical analysis on Piedmont municipalities con￿rms these
hypotheses; there is strong evidence that only Mayors that could be re-elected
(and in particular, unsafe Mayors) used the income tax surcharge to reduce the
property tax, and some weaker evidence that during the period in which the
reform was enacted there was an increase in the probability of running again
and winning by incumbents. In general terms, our results then suggest that
the issue of accountability in local ￿nance has to be taken seriously. It implies
for instance that in determining the optimal ￿nancing structure for local gov-
ernments, paramount attention should be given in providing local governments
with ￿nancial tools which allowed for a clear accountability of governments to
citizens. Our analysis focussed only on taxes, because this was the main con-
tent of the Italian reform, but clearly the argument is more general and involves
other forms of ￿nancing, such as grants and debt. Further theoretical and em-
pirical analyses along these lines would be very useful in providing a better
understanding of these important policy issues.
7 Appendix 1
7.1 The problem with two tax tools
Consider the problem in equation (16). Let
F(;t;s;T) = U(H()) pH()+(1 (T +t))L(T +t)+V (1 L(T +t))+
E   s
2(1   H()   tL(T + t))2
be the maximand of the local government. The two ￿rst order conditions
can then be written
F(;t;s;T) =  rH()+s(1 H() tL(T +t))(H()+H0()) =
0
Ft(;t;s;T) =  L(T +t)+s(1 H() tL(T +t))(L(T +t)+tL0(T +
t)) = 0
7.1.1 Second order conditions
The SOC conditions requires F(;t;s;T) < 0; Ftt(;t;s;T) < 0; FFtt >
(Ft)2:
Computing:
29F =  sH())2(1 "h())2 +H0()(se  r)+se(H0()+H00())
but by the FOC (se   r) = se"h() implying
F =  sH())2(1   "h())2 +se("h()H0() + H0() + H00())
which can be written as









H())("h()+1+H00()=H0()) . Hence, "h
()  0
is again a su￿cient condition for F < 0: By the same token,
Ftt =  sL()(1   t

 "l())2   se

2 (T"l() + t"l
())
thus, "l
()  0 is again a su￿cient condition for Ftt < 0: Now note,
Ft =  sL()H()((1   t

 "l())(1   "h()) < 0
Implying (Ft)2 = s2L()2H()2((1   t

 "l())2(1   "h())2
Now notice that multiplying FttF the ￿rst term coincides with (Ft)2 which
then cancels out in the di￿erence FFtt   (Ft)2; leaving only positive terms.
This shows that "h
()  0, "l
()  0 are su￿cient conditions to guarantee the
SOC.
7.1.2 Comparative statics
Changes in s Di￿erentiating totally the FOC, we get:
Fd + Ftdt + Fsds = 0
Ftd + Fttdt + Ftsds = 0
forming the matrix and inverting we get:
d
ds =   1
(FttFs   FtFts)
dt
ds =   1
(FFts   FtFs)
where  = FFtt   (Ft)2 > 0
Fs = eH(1   "h()) > 0;
Fts = eL(1   t

 "l()) > 0;
but the FOC implies r(1  t

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t) and sign dt






















 "l())(1   "h()) =
=  se

2 rH(T"l() + t"l
()):
Hence "l
() > 0 implies d
ds > 0:
We can then conclude that "h
() > 0 and "l
() > 0 guarantee both the SOC
and d
ds > 0 and dt
ds > 0: Furthermore, as at the equilibrium, both elasticities




Rewriting, condition () can also be written as
u((s;T);t(s;T);T)   u((s;T);t(s;T);T) +
s
2




((e(s;T)+(e e))(e(s;T) (e e))) > 0 (36)
note that
e(s;T)   e e = e(s;T)   e(s;T) + (T   T)L(T + t(s;T)) (37)
applying a FO Taylor approximation:
e(s;T)   e(s;T)  tL0(T + t(s;T))T (38)
where T = T   T > 0: It follows;
e(s;T)   e e  (L(T + t(s;T)) + tL0(T + t(s;T)))T = L(1  
t

"l())T > 0 (39)
where
L = L(T + t(s;T));t = t(s;T) (40)
 = T + t(s;T) (41)
Similarly, invoking the FOC for government maximization:
u((s;T);t(s;T);T)   u((s;T);t(s;T);T)   LT (42)
31Note further by the FOC for government maximization











"l())(s((e(s;T)+(e e)) s2e(s; T)) (44)
now note that
2e(s; T) > e(s;T) + e e (45)
and recall that s > s. The sign of () is then generally uncertain. In particular,





Consider the case where consumers, contrary to the assumption into the text,
can perfectly observe the tax rate set by the central government. Repeating
the analysis of the previous section, it is then clear that the incompetent Mayor
in the ￿rst period has only two possible strategies to play. He might either
play his preferred strategy, sets (s;T);t(s;T);e(s;T) in the ￿rst period and
accepts defeat at the elections. Or he can mimic the competent type, plays
(s;T);t(s;T); selects e appropriately so as to guarantee the unit level of
services, and hopes this will result in a re-election for him. Repeating again
the analysis of section 2, it is clear that by playing the mimicking strategy the
incompetent Mayor su￿ers a loss in the ￿rst period given by:
 w2(T) = u((s;T);t(s;T);T)  
s
2
(e(s;T))2   w(T;s) < 0 (46)
and he obtains a potential advantage in the second one, if he is elected, given
by:
(w(T;s)) + E (47)
where  is the expectation operator and where expectations are here taken
with respect to the probability that T be high or low in the second period. The





Where again n2 is the expected probability of being elected if playing the mim-
icking strategy for the incompetent government and  is the discount factor.
Repeating the analysis of the previous section, we can again conclude that in
a fully pooling equilibrium where incompetent Mayor are known to play the
mimicking strategy, n2 = 1.
327.3.2 Proof of proposition 2
By the benchmark analysis above, we know that if   k2(T) and the national
government selects T in the ￿rst period, there exists a fully pooling equilibrium
in pure strategies, where the incompetent Mayor just replicates in the ￿rst period
the choices of the competent Mayor for T = T: Notice that this equilibrium is
robust to all possible deviations.   k2(T) guarantees that the incompetent
Mayor is better o￿ by playing the fully pooling strategy rather than selecting
his preferred strategy, as this would lead to sure defeat at the elections, and
  k2(T) guarantees that his ￿rst period losses from playing the fully pooling
strategy are more than compensated by the re-election. When T = T the fully
pooling strategy also dominates the partial pooling strategy, because whatever
the beliefs of the consumer upon observing a deviation to  = T + t(s;T) and
 = (s;T) from the fully pooling equilibrium, this deviation could not possibly
give the incompetent Mayor a better chance of elections and furthermore by
deviating to the partial pooling strategy he would incur a larger loss in the
￿rst period. If instead the central government sets T = T , we know from the
analysis in the text that providing that condition () is satis￿ed and   k3(T),
there exists a partial pooling equilibrium where the incompetent Mayor plays
(,) in the ￿rst period and it is then re-elected for sure. Finally, we also
derived in the benchmark case a fully pooling equilibrium for the case when
T = T and   k2(T). However,providing that condition () is satis￿ed, it
is not clear if this equilibrium is robust to a deviation to the partial pooling
strategy, where the incompetent Mayor plays ( ,) instead. When more than a
perfect Bayesian equilibrium is an e￿ect, the rational consumer may be confused
on which equilibrium strategies are e￿ectively being played (see Bordignon and
Minelli, 2001). If by observing (,) in the ￿rst period, the consumer believes
that either the partial pooling equilibrium at (,) is played or the fully pooling
equilibrium at (,) is played, he would then rationally re-elect the incumbent
Mayor. But then, as by condition () the ￿rst period losses under the partial
pooling equilibrium are lower than under the full pooling equilibrium when T =
T; the incompetent Mayor would now have a pro￿table deviation which would
destroy the fully pooling equilibrium at T = T. Finally note that condition
() implies that k2(T) > k3(T); hence, for k2(T) >   k3(T), there exists no
full pooling strategy at T = T while it does exist a partial pooling equilibrium.
QED
8 Appendix 2
In the GMM-SYS estimation of model (31) we use as instruments for ￿rst
di￿erences equation the following variables (strictly exogenous): log(Dit),
log(X0
it), and di￿erenced year dummies. For the same ￿rst di￿erences equa-
tion we use the following endogenous variables. Lagged level up to t-2 of:
log(it 1), (D  tit) , (tit), (Yit) and di￿erenced main residence tax
allowance. Instruments for levels equation are the following (strictly exogenous
): log(Dit) ,log(X0
it) and year dummies. For the same levels equation we use the
following endogenous variables: the di￿erence of log(it 1), (Dtit) ,(tit), (Yit)
and level of main residence tax allowance. Matrix of instruments Z composed
of the above described variables has been collapsed to save in the dimension of
33instruments matrix. All estimates have been performed considering Yit , tit and
tax allowances as completely endogenous and tit  Dit as predetermined.
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39Table 11: First term mayors statistics
Number of Number of Number of Number of Number of
safe(a) FT unsafe(b) FT FT(c) ST elections
mayors mayors mayors
1999 316 344 660 84 961
2004 91 135 226 604 943
(a) >1/3 margin with respect to challenger
in previous elections
(b) <1/3 margin with respect to challenger
in previous elections
(c) we report only the number of FT winners



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































42Table 14: Probit estimates : probability of running again.
Probit(a) Probit(b) IV probit(c) IV probit(d)
year1999 0.185* 0.179 0.187 0.178
(2.04) (1.66) (1.87) (1.55)
year2004 0.088 0.104 0.088 0.116
(1.16) (1.18) (1.17) (1.15)
year2006 0.102 0.112 0.102 0.164
(1.51) (1.49) (1.28) (1.53)
Property tax 0.010 0.001 0.011 -0.007
(main) (0.59) (0.09) (0.59) (0.30)
Mayor’s age -0.003** -0.004*** -0.003** -0.004**
(-3.05) (-4.35) (-3.08) (-3.24)
Inc.% votes 0.002 0.0005
(prev. el.) (0.94) (0.90)
*** p < 0:01, ** p < 0:05, * p < 0:1
Observations 1701 1433 1701 1433
p-value exogeneity test (
2) 0.918 0.890
Log pseudolikelihood -786.95 -641.75 -153650 -139072.1
(a)-(d) A constant and other year dummies,
domestic stability pact dummy coe￿. not included
to save space. (c) and (d) Instruments used for prop. tax rate:
property tax base dimension in 1999,
percentage of holiday houses, population level.
t stat. in brackets.
Coe￿. are marginal probability e￿ects computed at the regressor means.
Clustered-robust standard errors used in estimates.
43Table 15: Probit estimates : probability of winning.
Probit(a) Probit(b) IV probit(c) IV probit(d)
year1999 0.047 0.057 0.051 0.062
(0.43) (0.59) (0.48) (0.58)
year2004 0.021 0.066 0.029 0.065
(0.22) (0.80) (1.28) (0.90)
year2006 -0.010 -0.004 -0.018 -0.007
(-0.14) (0.02) (-0.17) (1.43)
Property tax -0.026 -0.023 0.034 0.004
(main) (-1.24) (-1.34) (0.27) (0.71)
Mayor’s age -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.005** -0.004**
(-5.14) (-4.00) (-3.05) (-3.25)
Inc.% votes 0.002*** 0.002**
prev. el. (4.36) (4.01)
*** p < 0:01, ** p < 0:05, * p < 0:1
Observations 1348 1154 1348 1154
p-value exogeneity test (
2) 0.246 0.621
Log pseudolikelihood -547.49 -418.75 -128810 -107532.8
(a)-(d) A constant and other year dummies,
domestic stability pact dummy coe￿. not included
to save space. (c) and (d) Instruments used for prop. tax rate:
property tax base dimension in 1999,
percentage of holiday houses, population level
t stat. in brackets.
Clustered-robust standard errors used in estimates.
Coe￿. are marginal probability e￿ects computed at the regressor means.
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